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he Office of Administrative Law (OAL) was estab-
lished in Government Code section 11340 et seq. on
July 1, 1980, as part of major and unpreced nted
amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) made
by AB 1111 (McCarthy) (Chapter 567, Statutes of 1979). OAL
is charged with the orderly and systematic review of the pro-
posed regulations and regulatory changes of most California
agencies against six statutory standards: authority, necessity,
consistency, clarity, reference, and nonduplication. The goal
of OAL's review is to "reduce the number of administrative
regulations and to improve the quality of those regulations
which are adopted" (Government Code section 11340.1). OAL
is authorized to disapprove or repeal any regulation that, in
its determination, does not meet all six standards, or where
the adopting agency has not complied with the procedural
rulemaking requirements of the APA. OAL is also authorized
to review emergency regulations and disapprove those that
are not necessary for "the immediate preservation of the pub-
lic peace, health and safety, or
general welfare..." (Government On February 23,2001, QAL pt
Code section 11349.6).
Under Government Code to amend sections 121 thro
section 11340.5, OAL is autho- 1013, Title I of the CCR. Th
rized to issue so-called "regula- revise OAL's provisions
tory determinations" as to whether determinations.
state agency "underground
rules" -which have not been adopted in accordance with the
APA rulemaking process-are regulatory in nature and thus
legally enforceable only if adopted pursuant to APA require-
ments. In regulatory determinations, OAL analyzes: (1)
whether the agency accused of issuing or enforcing "under-
ground regulations" is subject to the APA; (2) if so, whether
the challenged policies are regulatory in nature and are "stan-
dards of general application" under Government Code sec-
tion 11340.5(a); (3) if so, whether the challenged policies
implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforced or
administered by the agency or govern its procedure, such that
they are "regulations" under the APA; and (4) if so, whether
the challenged policies are statutorily exempt from the APA's
rulemaking requirements.
The regulations of most California agencies are published
in the California Code of Regulations (CCR), which OAL is
responsible for preparing and maintaining. OAL also pub-
lishes the weekly California Regulatory Notice Register,
which contains agency notices of proposed rulemaking,
rulemaking petition decisions, OAL disapproval decisions,
regulatory determinations, and other notices of general inter-
est.
The OAL Director is appointed by the Governor and must
be confirmed by the Senate. At this writing, OAL has been
U
functioning without a director since Janu-
ary 1999, when Governor Davis withdrew
Governor Wilson's appointment of Edward
Heidig before the Senate could confirm it. On January 28,
2000, Governor Gray Davis appointed David B. Judson as
deputy director and chief counsel for OAL. From 1990-2000,
Judson was deputy legislative counsel for the Office of Leg-
islative Counsel. He served as a deputy attorney general from
1978 to 1990, and as staff counsel for the California State
Lands Commission from 1973 to 1978.
MAJOR PROJECTS
OAL Seeks to Modify
Regulatory Determination Procedure
On February 23, 2001, OAL published notice of its in-
tent to amend sections 121 through 128 and adopt Form 1013,
Title 1 of the CCR. The regulatory action would revise OAL's
provisions concerning regulatory
determinations. OAL proposes to
bshed notice of its intent adopt a form to be used by per-
rug18andry adiopt Ford sons wishing to request that OAL
ronegaryion uldy determine whether a state agency
concerning regulatory has engaged in underground
rulemaking. Form 1013, "Request
for Determination," would require
the following information: name, address, telephone num-
ber, fax number, and email address of the requester; name of
the involved state agency; and either a copy of the written
rule or a copy of the document created by the agency that
articulates or describes the rule being challenged. The form
would state that OAL will not accept a request for determina-
tion of an alleged rule that cannot be documented with writ-
ten evidence that comes from the agency.
Form 1013 would require the requester to attach all writ-
ten information or evidence regarding the rule. It would also
require the requester to state whether the issue has been
brought to the attention of the head of the state agency in-
volved. If so, the requester must also attach copies of any
written communications. The requester must sign a statement
on the form, under penalty of perjury, affirming the requester's
belief that all the information submitted is true and correct.
Section 123 requires OAL, within five working days af-
ter the date of receipt of a request for determination, to trans-
mit a written notification of receipt to the requester. OAL
proposes to replace this provision with a requirement that OAL
notify the requester within 30 calendar days whether Form
1013 is "complete and has been accepted for filing."
Under the proposal, OAL will not accept any request for
determination if the challenged rule: (1) has been superseded;




(2) has expired by its own terms; (3) has been declared by the
agency to have been rescinded or no longer in effect; (4) has
been nullified by a final court judgment; (5) is contained in a
duly adopted regulation; (6) is contained in a statute; (7) is
clearly within the scope of an express statutory exemption
from the APA; or (8) is the same, or is substantially the same,
as a rule from the same state agency on which OAL has al-
ready issued a determination.
The proposal would delete the concept of "active con-
sideration" that is currently found in sections 123 and 124
and that defines the point at which OAL begins its 75-day
schedule for completing a determination. The schedule itself
is retained in the proposal, but its initiation would instead be
triggered "as soon as program resources permit" OAL to be-
gin work on the determination; to signal that the timeline has
begun, OAL will publish a summary of the request in the
California Regulatory Notice Register and send a notice to
both the requester and the agency.
The proposed action would also make changes to the
process by which OAL accepts comments concerning regu-
latory determinations. The amendment to section 124 would
require the published summary of the request to include com-
ment submission requirements along with the deadline for
submission. It would delete the existing requirement that a
commenter be an "interested" person. Commenters would be
required to send copies of their comments to the requester.
The proposal would permit OAL to request and consider
supplemental information from a commenter.
OAL held a hearing on the matter on April 10, 2001 and,
at this writing, is in the process of revising the proposal to ad-
dress the comments received at that hearing. Upon completion
of that revision process, OAL will release the new version of
the rulemaking proposal for an additional 15-day period.
Regulatory Determinations
Following is a summary of regulatory determinations
issued by OAL between November 1, 1999 and April 30,2001.
* 1999 OAL Determination No. 26, Docket No. 98-011
(November 3,1999). This request for determination, submit-
ted to OAL on November 2, 1998 by the California Taxpay-
ers' Association, questioned whether eight sales and use tax
annotations contained in the Business Taxes Law Guide is-
sued by the State Board of Equalization (BOE) are "regula-
tions" that must be adopted pursuant to the APA to be valid.
BOE publishes and utilizes sales and use tax annotations as a
guide to the application of sales and use tax statutes and regu-
lations to specific transactions. At the outset, OAL established
that, because the APA generally applies to all state agencies
in the executive branch, its rulemaking requirements are ap-
plicable to BOE.
Next, OAL analyzed each of the eight annotations to de-
termine whether they should be considered regulations. The
first test of this analysis is whether the challenged provision
is either "a rule or standard of general application, or modifi-
cation or supplement to such a rule." For example, the first
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challenged annotation (195.2000) concerns the taxability of
paint used in making labels. According to OAL, "[i]t is readily
apparent that the codified regulation [section 1589, Title 18
of the CCR] operates generally to make labels exempt from
sales and use tax. It is also clear that this section does not
mention paint used to make labels on containers... .Thus the
annotation interprets the tax exemption for the sale of labels
in a manner broad enough to include the sale of paint to be
used for making a label. The annotation is therefore a 'regu-
lation' (emphasis original).
The next annotation (295.1740) states that sale of struc-
tural plans-including engineering fees, postage, labor and
handling-is subject to sales tax. OAL found that the provi-
sion of the annotation concerning engineering fees is the only
legally tenable interpretation of Revenue and Taxation Code
section 6012 (such that it is not underground rulemaking),
and that section 6012 also exempts "transportation" of struc-
tural plans from sales tax. By subjecting "postage" to sales
tax, "[tihe annotation thus limits the tax exemption for trans-
portation charges, indicating that it does not apply to postage
paid for the shipment of structural plans to persons interested
in building their own structures, even when such charges are
separately stated. This portion of the annotation is therefore a
,regulation."'
The third challenged annotation (190.2543) concerns the
taxability of stolen construction materials, which is governed
by section 1521, Title 18 of the CCR (entitled "Construction
Contractors"). After analyzing the regulation and the annota-
tion, OAL concluded that the annotation is a regulation be-
cause it interprets section 1521.
According to OAL, the fourth annotation (190.0777) is
"designed to penetrate the smoke of a complex subcontract-
ing arrangement between a road mix supplier and a road build-
ing contractor." OAL held that "if the annotation simply ap-
plies the statutory definition of 'retailer' to a set of facts and
does not interpret, implement, or make specific Title 18 of
the CCR, section 1521, then the challenged annotation is not
a 'regulation."' However, "if the rule of the annotation makes
it necessary for road mix suppliers to collect sales tax on all
sales of road mix to contractors, then the annotation would
likely make it impossible for contractors to purchase road
mix tax free and then act as retailers of road mix. If the anno-
tation is interpreted in this manner, it has the effect of amend-
ing section 1521 by excluding contractors from the retailing
of road mix, and is a 'regulation.' Without additional infor-
mation concerning use of the annotation by the Board, it is
impossible for OAL to completely resolve the question."
The fifth challenged annotation (110.1440) subjects to taxa-
tion the sale of fish to zoos and public aquariums as food for
animal inhabitants. Section 1587, Title 18 of the CCR, pro-
vides that any form of animal life sold as food for human con-
sumption is not taxed, nor is feed for food animals or non-food
animals that are raised to be sold. However, tax does apply to
retail sales of non-food animals. "Thus we see that section 1587
does not provide a clear answer to the question of whether sales
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of fish to aquariums and zoos for animal feed are taxable....By
definitively resolving these questions, the annotation interprets
section 1587 and is therefore a 'regulation."'
Both the sixth (195.0360) and seventh (195.1480) chal-
lenged annotations deal with egg containers. "The limitation
which denies tax exempt status when a container is first used
for transporting eggs to processors, even if the container is
later used in a tax exempt manner, is found neither in Rev-
enue and Taxation Code section 6364...nor in section 1589 of
Title 18 of the CCR. It interprets these laws by specifying the
applicability of sales and use tax in a situation they do not
address. Similarly, the rule on repurchase of containers and
its 50 percent limitation are not contained in the applicable
statutes or regulations properly adopted pursuant to the APA.
The annotation is therefore an interpretation of law and a
'regulation."'
The final challenged annotation (120.0660) concerns the
taxability of electronic files transferred on computer disks.
OAL noted the general rule that sales tax applies only to the
sale of tangible property, not to services. Thus in computer
programs, the taxability analysis usually focuses on whether
the software is acquired by means of a tangible product, such
as a disk, or through an intangible medium, such as an Internet
download. OAL concluded that the annotation had "an effect
different from the regulation, although it may be that we do
not fully understand section 1502 [Title 18 of the CCRI. In
any event, the...annotation interprets the confusing rules on
the taxability of computer programs." Thus, OAL found the
eighth annotation to be an underground regulation.
Finally, OAL considered whether the challenged annota-
tions fall within the "legal rulings of counsel" exemption (Gov-
ernment Code section 11342(g)) to the APA's rulemaking re-
quirements. OAL concluded that the annotations lack the indi-
cia of legal rulings of counsel. "The requester has noted, and
the Board has not disagreed, that all the challenged annota-
tions lack legal analysis, that some are not supported by docu-
mentation identifying the context in which they were issued,
and at least one was not prepared by an attorney. The Board is
in the process of adopting a regulation to specify the necessary
elements in a legal ruling of counsel. In its reply, the Board
acknowledges that the annotations do not contain all of the
elements that would be required under the proposed regula-
tion. The Board is in the process of deleting all eight of the
challenged annotations from the Business Taxes Law Guide."
* 1999 OAL Determination No. 27, Docket No. 99-001
(November 30, 1999). Requester Carl D. McQuillion, a life
prisoner whose commitment offense occurred prior to July 1,
1977, challenged two unwritten policies of the Board of Prison
Terms pertaining to parole. The first policy questioned by Mr.
McQuillion is that the Board denies parole release to all life
prisoners sentenced under the Indeterminate Sentencing Law
(ISL) and most (99.97% according to the requester's statistics,
which the Board did not challenge in its response) life prison-
ers sentenced under the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act
(DSL). According to the request for determination, the Board
accomplishes this systematic denial of parole "by applying
extremely strong presumptions that such prisoners are unsuit-
able for parole and that any parole dates previously granted to
such prisoners were improvidently granted...."
The second unwritten policy challenged by Mr.
McQuillion is that the Board intentionally fails "to set new
parole dates for life prisoners...whose parole date had been
rescinded, and [applies] an all but irrefutable presumption in
rescheduling the hearing that it is not reasonable to expect
that parole would be granted to such prisoners if a hearing
were held during the following year(s)." Penal Code sections
3041 and 3041.5 require the Board to set a release date and
mandate an annual parole hearing after a hearing in which
parole has been denied unless "the board finds that it is not
reasonable to expect that parole would be granted at a hear-
ing during the following year," in which case the board may
delay the hearing for two years. If the prisoner has been con-
victed of murder, then under section 3041.5(b)(2)(B) the
Board may delay the next parole hearing up to five years upon
the appropriate finding of unsuitability by the Board.
OAL cited Penal Code section 5076.2 for its conclusion
that the Board is subject to APA rulemaking requirements.
Next OAL reminded the parties of its role: "OAL makes no
finding as to the existence or nonexistence of the alleged un-
written policies and practices. OAL is legally mandated to
determine whether the challenged agency policies and prac-
tices, if they exist, constitute 'regulations' which are without
legal effect unless adopted pursuant to the APA." OAL also
noted that it possesses "no authority in the determination arena
to find whether alleged policies or practices of the Board, or
duly adopted regulations of the Board, are inconsistent with
statute and should be invalidated."
Regarding the threshold test, OAL held that "challenged
rule no. I as alleged applies extremely strong presumptions to
all ISL and DSL life prisoners in California, and, therefore, is a
standard of general application. Challenged rule no. 2 as al-
leged applies to all life prisoners in California ...whose parole
date was rescinded and, therefore, also is a standard of general
application." OAL also found that the alleged policies do not
fall within the internal management exemption to the APA's
rulemaking requirements, nor within any other exemption.
Concerning the first alleged policy, OAL held that an un-
written practice of "denying parole release to almost all.. life
prisoners by denial of suitability and systematic rescission of
previously granted parole dates by applying extremely strong
presumptions that such prisoners are unsuitable for parole and
that any parole dates previously granted to such prisoners were
improvidently granted would interpret [Penal Code section 3060
and sections 2450 and 2451 of Title 15 of the CCR] as well as
Penal Code section 3041 and would amend sections 2281 and
2402 of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. Since the
alleged policy, if it exists, meets both parts of the statutory two-
part test, OAL concludes it is a 'regulation."' Similarly, OAL
found that "challenged rule no. 2, if it exists, is not merely a
restatement of existing law but rather interprets sections 3041.5
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and 3041 of the Penal Code." Hence, OAL held that the sec-
ond policy, if it exists, is also an underground regulation.
* 1999 OAL Determination No. 28, Docket No. 99-002
(December 23, 1999). Requester Daniel Jester, a California
Men's Colony-East inmate, challenged four separate rules
issued by the Department of Corrections (DOC) and the war-
den of the prison in which Jester is incarcerated.
OAL held that the "Operations Manual Supplement for
Volume VI" issued by the warden contains regulatory mate-
rial, but it is not subject to the APA because of the "special
express APA exception for rules applying solely to a particu-
lar prison....However, to the extent this document restates pro-
visions in the 'Close Custody Guide for Male Inmates' is-
sued by the Department of Corrections, the specified statu-
tory conditions are not met and the 'local rule' exception does
not apply .... The 'Close Custody Guide for Male
Inmates'...contains 'regulations' and should have been
adopted in accordance with the APA."
OAL delineated the necessary analysis for the local rule
exception: "When a challenged rule superficially appears to
be a local prison rule, OAL must determine whether it actu-
ally qualifies under this statutory APA exception....If the ac-
tion is not only of local concern, but of statewide importance,
it qualifies as a regulation despite the fact it is called 'resolu-
tions,' 'guidelines,' 'rulings,' and the like....The APA is not
so limited that its reach can be avoided by the simple expedi-
ent of directing local prisons to adopt standardized rules."
Concerning the Close Custody Guide, DOC argued that
"non-mandatory guidelines were provided by [the Depart-
ment], but the scheme envisioned implementation via local
rules formulated by the facilities." In the almost identical 1999
OAL Determination No. 22 [17:1 CRLR 219], the Depart-
ment had advanced the same reasoning, urging that "non-man-
datory rules are not 'regulations' subject to APA rulemaking
requirements." OAL responded by quoting its previous opin-
ion: "The statutory definition of 'regulation' does not restrict
the term 'regulation' to agency rules that are binding and
mandatory....Apparently anticipating that state agencies would
make creative legal arguments in an effort to avoid APA com-
pliance, the statute prohibits not only enforcement, attempted
enforcement, and utilization of rules subject to the APA, but
also the mere issuance of such rules."
Regarding the second challenged document, the "Close
Custody B Criteria Chart," OAL found that the Chart "for the
most part restates provisions contained in the 'Close Custody
Guide for Male Inmates.'...To the extent that challenged rule
no. 2 restates the centrally issued standard it contains regula-
tions that should have been adopted pursuant to the APA be-
cause the statutory conditions have not been met and the 'lo-
cal rule' exception does not apply."
OAL held that a memo entitled "Security Enhancements"
issued by the warden contains regulations, but that those regu-
lations fall within the local rule exemption to APA rulemaking
procedures. The memo contains changes to the custody ar-
rangements for California Men's Colony inmates.
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The fourth item challenged by the requester is a memo
entitled "CMC Appeal Log #E-98-1067, Second Level Re-
view, Action Requested: Be Returned to Diet Kitchen As-
signment." OAL determined that the memo, which includes
three provisions from the Department of Corrections Op-
erations Manual, contains some restatements of existing law,
some regulatory material to which the local rule exemption
applies, and some underground regulations that should have
been adopted in accordance with APA rulemaking proce-
dure.
* 2000 OAL Determination No. 1, Docket No. 99-003
(January 13, 2000). On January 4, 1999, Ed Kuwatch, Esq.,
requested a determination regarding a policy of the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles (DMV) announced in a letter mailed
to members of the drunk driving defense bar in December
1998. The policy concerns a statutory scheme that permits an
arresting officer to serve upon a drunk driver an immediate
notice of driving privilege suspension. As stated in DMV's
letter, the policy provides that a request for an automatic ad-
ministrative hearing on the suspension must be made within
ten days after the driver receives the notice; however, DMV
"will continue to accept and grant any written requests for
late administrative hearings from drivers who provide good
cause to support such a decision."
OAL first determined that under Vehicle Code section
1651, DMV is expressly required to adopt regulations in ac-
cordance with the APA. Next, OAL concluded that because
the policy applies to the class of all those arrested for drunk
driving who have been issued an "Administrative Per Se Or-
der" of suspension, revocation, or temporary endorsement, it
is a standard of general application.
In its response, DMV claimed that the policy found in
the letter merely restates existing law. OAL agreed that the
issue for this determination is whether the challenged policy
is a restatement of the law or, instead, whether it implements,
interprets, or makes specific existing law. OAL held that, for
the most part, the challenged rule restates existing law found
in several sections of the Vehicle Code. "However, to the ex-
tent the challenged rule specifies that the Department will
only grant a hearing for late requests which are 'written' and
'provide good cause,' the challenged rule is not restating pro-
visions in the...statutes. These limitations make specific the
more general language in section 14103 of the Vehicle Code
and thus are 'regulations."'
* 2000 OAL Determination No.2, Docket No. 99-004
(January 18,2000). Requester John K. Reiss, Esq., challenged
one bulletin and five directives issued by the state Employ-
ment Development Department (EDD) regarding the Job Train-
ing Partnership Office (JTPO). This is Mr. Reiss's second chal-
lenge to EDD's procedures under the federal Job Training Part-
nership Act (JTPA). On June 16, 1998, OAL issued 1998 OAL
Determination No. 6, which held that "State Grievance and
Hearing Procedures Under the Job Training Partnership Act"
in EDD's JTPO Policy/Procedure Bulletin #84-8 (June 18,
1984) was an underground regulation. Reiss had filed the re-
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quest for that determination in December of 1990; the request
for this determination was filed in January 1999.
The threshold determination is always whether the issu-
ing agency is subject to the APA. Government Code section
11000 broadly defines "state agencies," but the APA narrows
its scope of coverage by excluding those agencies in the leg-
islative and judicial branches. In this determination, OAL
stated: "Clearly, EDD is a 'state agency' within the meaning
of the APA. Further, EDD has not called our attention to nor
have we located any statutory provision expressly exempting
EDD rules from the APA. OAL, therefore, concludes that APA
rulemaking requirements generally apply to EDD."
The challenged policies are: (1) EDD Policy/Procedure
Bulletin 84-13 on audit resolution, (2) EDD Directive No.
D97-11 on debt collection, (3) EDD Directive D98-9 on de-
barment of indebted service providers, (4) EDD Directive No.
D97-6 on procurement, (5) EDD Directive No. D98-11 on
confidential information, and (6) EDD Directive No. D98-5
on reporting requirements. EDD freely admitted that each of
these six policy publications contains regulatory material, and
even took the additional step of highlighting the specific ar-
eas that EDD itself had identified as having characteristics of
underground rules. Nevertheless, EDD claimed that the rules
in question fall under Government Code section 11 343(a)(3),
which provides an exemption for rules "directed to a specifi-
cally named person or group of persons and which do not
apply generally throughout the state."
OAL disagreed with EDD's contention. "If OAL were to
accept the Department's argument that the group of persons
listed on the memo fell within the 'specifically named person
or group of persons' exemption, then to issue a memo to 'All
California Residents' would also qualify as a 'specifically
named person or group of persons.' EDD also ignores the
second part of Government Code section 11343, subdivision
(a)(3) which states '...and does not apply generally through-
out the state.' Clearly,...each of the six directives applies gen-
erally throughout the state...." Accordingly, OAL held that
each of the challenged directives contains underground regu-
lations that are without legal effect because EDD has not
adopted them in compliance with the APA.
* 2000 OAL Determination No. 3, Docket No. 99-005
(February 2, 2000). Requester California State Employees
Association (CSEA) challenged two job production standards
of the State Board of Equalization (BOE) concerning hourly
key stroke and daily machine time minimums for key data
operators employed by the Board.
In its response, BOE first contended that the challenged
standards are not regulations because they are not rules of
general application, arguing that "even under the most lib-
eral construction," the term "general application" could not
pertain to "a rule that applies only to a select few employees
in a single section of a single agency... .Here the challenged
policy applies to approximately 30 employees....None of the
rules apply to all, or even a substantial portion of the 4,000-
plus employees of the BOE."
OAL responded that while it is true that the affected
group of employees is small, "the size of the group to which
rules apply is not the pivotal legal issue. According to the
California Court of Appeal, the issue is whether or not the
rules apply generally to all members of a class, kind, or or-
der. In the matter at hand, the work production standards
apply to all members of the class of key data operators em-
ployed by the Board. The standards are thus 'standards of
general application.' From the legal perspective, the num-
ber of persons in the group is not determinative: indeed, a
rule could be drafted in such a way as to in fact apply to
only one person or entity."
Next, BOE asserted that the standards in question should
not be considered regulations because they do not implement
the law enforced by the Board. BOE stated in its response:
"Clearly, the matters presented to OAL have nothing to do
with the implementation or interpretation of the tax laws un-
der the authority of the Board...." Again OAL did not agree,
citing two Government Code sections that are implemented,
interpreted, or made specific by the challenged standards.
Section 15606(a) directs BOE to "prescribe rules for its own
government and for the transaction of its business." Section
11152 permits the heads of each state governmental depart-
ment to "adopt such rules and regulations as are necessary to
govern the activities of the department...." Consequently, OAL
held that the challenged standards are regulations.
BOE next argued that the challenged policies are exempt
from APA rulemaking requirements under the "internal man-
agement" exemption in Government Code section 11 342(g).
The analysis as to whether the APA's internal management
exception applies is dual: the regulation at issue must (1) af-
fect only the employees of the issuing agency, and (2) not
address a matter of serious consequence involving an impor-
tant public interest. Regarding the first prong, OAL stated:
"We do not agree with CSEA's contention that the standards
affect 'the general population of the state for any party inter-
ested in applying for employment with the Board.' The stan-
dards have no effect on anyone other than those current em-
ployees of the Board working as key data operators." Conse-
quently, OAL found that the first test for the internal man-
agement exception had been met.
The test that OAL will apply in determining whether a
regulation addresses a matter of serious consequence involv-
ing an important public interest is neither clearly defined nor
easily predictable. From its response, it is apparent that BOE
had gleaned from previous regulatory determinations that rules
concerning employee discipline were more likely to be judged
by OAL as serious and important than rules simply providing
employee standards. Thus, even though this case was origi-
nated by a BOE key data operator (whose bargaining agent is
CSEA) who was disciplined by the Board for her failure to
meet the standards at issue here, BOE nevertheless attempted
to characterize the challenged standards as non-disciplinary
in nature. According to the Board' "while production stan-
dards may be considered in subsequent decisions concerning
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he employee's job, these rules are clearly not a part of the
disciplinary process."
On this point, OAL was persuaded by BOE. "Routine
unit rules concerning quantity and quality of work are not
matters of serious consequence involving an important pub-
lic interest....These are the sorts of internal agency rules which
he Legislature intended to exempt from rulemaking require-
ments by enacting the internal management exception." Find-
ing the internal management exception applicable, OAL held
that the challenged standards are not subject to APA
rulemaking requirements.
* 2000 OAL Determination No. 4, Docket No. 99-006
(February 2,2000). In January 1999, John K. Reiss, Esq., filed
two requests for determination with OAL challenging policies
of EDD's Job Training Partnership Office (JTPO) under the
Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), resulting in 2000 OAL
Determination No. 2 (see above) and this Determination No.
4. Here, Reiss questioned the validity of four additional docu-
ments: (1) JTPA Directive No. D98-6, reporting fraud and
abuse; (2) EDD Directive D87-7, glossary of terms; (3) EDD
Information Bulletin B98-2, data validation; and (4) EDD In-
terim Directive 94-16, allowable cost principles.
EDD asserted that the definitions contained in D87-7 are
not regulations because, as mere definitions, they have no
regulatory effect. According to EDD's argument, "the regu-
latory effect (if there is any regulatory effect) will occur when
[the definitions] are used in other EDD administrative docu-
ments." OAL countered that "EDD's argument cannot stand
in light of the direct language contained in directive 87-7. It
mandates implementation and adoption of the definitions
contained in the glossary. Directive D87-7 therefore imparts
more than definitional information. It requires action...."
Applying the same logic as it did in Determination No. 2,
OAL found that: (1) the APA applies to EDD; (2) the chal-
lenged documents "all contain rules which have general appli-
cability and make specific the terms of the JTPA, federal regu-
lations, and Unemployment Insurance Code sections"; (3) no
APA exemptions apply; and (4) the rules established by the
four documents, except those which are restatements of exist-
ing state or federal law, are not valid because they have not
been adopted according to APA rulemaking procedure.
* 2000 OAL Determination No. 5, Docket No. 99-007
(February 24,2000). In February 1999, requester Healthdent
of California, Inc. challenged the method utilized by the De-
partment of Corporations for calculating the number of en-
rollees in health plans for the purpose of assessing annual
fees.
The Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975
provides for the regulation of California health care service
plans (also called "health plans" or "health maintenance or-
ganizations"). Prior to July 2000, each licensee plan paid an
annual fee to the Department of Corporations; now they pay
annual fees to the Department of Managed Health Care. The
purpose of the fee is to reimburse the Department for the costs
associated with administering the Knox-Keene Act. The
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amount of the fee is assessed by the Commissioner based on
the number of enrollees in the plan.
Healthdent is a licensed health plan. It arranges for its
subscribers to receive dental care through contracts with other
dental providers, and it also operates its own dental care fa-
cilities. At these facilities, Healthdent provides services to its
own subscribers as well as to subscribers of other health care
service plans. In determining Healthdent's annual assessment,
the Commissioner counted not only Healthdent's own sub-
scribers, but also "enrollees obtained through contracts with
other plans."
OAL first noted that under Corporations Code section
25614, APA rulemaking requirements are applicable to the
Department. Next, OAL found that "the requirement for pay-
ing an annual assessment or fee applies generally to member
of a 'class, kind or order.' That class would encompass all
Knox-Keene health care service plans licensed by the
Commissioner....Therefore, the Commissioner's method of
determining the amount of annual fees to be paid by health
care service plans is a standard of general application."
The Department asserted that "there is no rule because
whatever assessment is made is the consequence or result of
transactions occurring between various health care plans."
OAL disagreed, stating: "Of regulatory necessity, the Com-
missioner must determine who is an 'enrollee' for purposes
of assessing these fees .... The Commissioner has done
this....The rule essentially states that 'enrollees' in health care
service plans may be 'acquired' through subcontracts with
other plans. That is the 'regulation' which interprets, imple-
ments or makes specific the term 'enrollees' as it is used in
the statute."
Next, the Department argued that "the procedure followed
by the Commissioner to calculate the annual assessment for
Healthdent is a direct application of Health and Safety Code
section 1356(b)," prompting OAL to consider whether the
Department's interpretation of the statutory requirement is
the only legally tenable one. "If a rule simply applies an ex-
isting constitutional, statutory or regulatory requirement that
has only one legally tenable 'interpretation,' that rule is not
quasi-legislative in nature-no new 'law' is created." OAL
found that the Department's claim that it is merely following
the statutory mandate by "counting all the enrollees in every
plan" amounts to a circular argument "because the term 'en-
rollees' means anyone so labeled by the Department." OAL
looked to Health and Safety Code section 1345(c), which
defines "enrollee" as a "person who is enrolled in a plan and
who is a recipient of services from the plan" (emphasis added
by OAL). "The Department's 'only tenable' interpretation
appears to ignore or even obliterate the separate elements
necessary for enrollment found in the statute. In doing this,
the Department introduces the concept of acquiring enrollees
through subcontracts." Finding that the Department's inter-
pretation is not the only tenable one, and perhaps not even
the most reasonable one under the existing statutory and regu-
latory scheme, OAL concluded that the Commissioner's
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method of calculation of the number of enrollees amounts to
an underground regulation that is invalid unless adopted ac-
cording to APA requirements.
* 2000 OAL Determination No. 6, Docket No. 99-008
(March 13,2000). Bruce Dear, Placer County Assessor, filed
a request for this determination on February 16, 1999 on be-
half of the California Assessors' Association. Dear questioned
two separate property tax exemption policies for multi-spe-
cialty medical clinics and religious organization housing pub-
lished in the Assessors 'Handbook, promulgated by the State
Board of Equalization.
In its response, BOE cited its enabling act, Government
Code section 15606, and argued that the legislature has made
a distinction between its subsection (c) duty to "prescribe rules
and regulations to govern local boards of equalization when
equalizing, and assessors when assessing..." and its subsec-
tion (e) duty to "prepare and issue instructions to assessors
designed to promote uniformity throughout the state and its
local taxing jurisdictions in the assessment of property for
the purposes of taxation." BOE reasoned that if OAL holds
the "instructions" in the Handbook, which the Board charac-
terized as non-binding, to be binding regulations, then the
statutory distinction between BOE's two separate duties would
be rendered meaningless and the intent of the legislature con-
founded.
OAL disagreed: "Had the Legislature wished to exempt
'instructions' issued by the Board from the APA, it could eas-
ily have done so. Government Code section 1342, subdivi-
sion (g), exempts from the definition of a 'regulation' subject
to the APA 'legal rulings of counsel issued by the...State Board
of Equalization.' Noticeably absent from this exemption is
the phrase 'instructions of the Board.'The fact that the Board
is given an express exemption as to legal rulings of counsel,
clearly reinforces the fact that every other Board activity (in-
cluding its 'instructions') is subject to review under the
APA....The Board's argument is premised on the misconcep-
tion that the existence or non-existence of a 'regulation' is
determined by its enabling legislation." Thus, OAL held that
the challenged provisions were subject to OAL scrutiny un-
der the APA.
Next, BOE argued that "the essential issue in determin-
ing whether an instruction is a regulation as defined in the
APA is whether the instruction is enforceable." OAL restated
this argument: "Put another way, if a 'regulation' is not 'bind-
ing' in the first instance, it makes no sense for it to subse-
quently be declared 'unenforceable' for failure to comply with
the APA." However, OAL again disagreed: "[E]nforceability
is not the linchpin for determining whether or not a 'regula-
tion' exists under the APA....The Board's argument confuses
legal enforceability with whether in fact the agency enforces
the particular rule. The two concepts are not the same. A de-
termination by either OAL or a court that a 'regulation' is
legally unenforceable does not depend on whether the regu-
lation was in fact enforced by the agency" (emphasis origi-
nal). The Board's theoretical argument aside, OAL also
pointed out that the Handbook provisions are "couched in
language which strongly implies the Board intends its poli-
cies to be applied uniformly throughout the State."
OAL's analysis of the challenged provisions observed
that, by their own terms, both apply on a statewide basis. Thus,
OAL easily concluded that the provisions are standards of
general application. OAL found that in both provisions, BOE
has gone beyond existing law to interpret or make specific.
Finally, BOE did not contend, nor did OAL discern, the pres-
ence of any applicable APA exemption. As a consequence,
OAL held that the challenged provisions are underground
regulations that should be adopted according to APA
rulemaking procedures.
* 2000 OAL Determination No. 7, Docket No. 99-00.
(April 17, 2000). Just as in 2000 OAL Determination No. 3
(above), CSEA filed this request for determination to chal-
lenge various employee work production standards used by
BOE's Taxpayer Records Unit, Cashiers Unit, and Return
Processing Unit. Following the identical logic of Determina-
tion No. 3, OAL found that the standards are "regulations" as
defined by the APA; however, they are exempt under the "in-
ternal management" exception. CSEA argued against appli-
cation of the APA's internal management exception by as-
serting that the standards touch upon matters of serious con-
sequence involving important public interests in that the rules
"have led to increased repetitive motion injuries, including
permanent damage to employees" and are also ultimately as-
sociated with the threat of discipline and dismissal. Never-
theless, OAL held that "routine unit rules concerning quan-
tity and quality of work are not matters of serious consequence
involving an important public interest. Prior determinations
where the 'internal management' exception was found not to
apply typically involved independent matters of important
public policy....Therefore, the challenged standards, though
'regulations,' are nonetheless exempt from the APA because
they relate solely to the internal management of the Board of
Equalization" (emphasis original).
* 2000 OAL Determination No. 8, Docket No. 99-010
(April 20,2000). Requester David William Finney originally
challenged 28 "administrative directives" of the Board of
Prison Terms. Subsequently, the Board rescinded all but six;
at Finney's request, OAL addressed only the remaining six in
this determination.
As was established in 1999 OAL Determination No. 27
(above), the Board of Prison Terms is subject to the APA un-
der Penal Code section 5076.2. OAL also concluded that each
of the six directives in question are standards of general ap-
plication. "All of the directives either pertain to or govern the
administration of prisoner parole or sentencing on a state-
wide basis."
Directive No. 81/4 deals with the situation in which the
court issues an amended abstract of judgment that alters the
prisoner's sentence. According to OAL, the directive imple-
ments and makes specific Penal Code section 1170.2(b); "it
appears to set additional time limits for situations not specifi-
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cally addressed in this statute. It creates special procedures
for situations involving amended abstracts.. .which are sus-
pected to be in error."
Penal Code section 3000(a) authorizes the Board to waive
parole "for good cause." Directive No. 82/15 provides the
criteria the Board utilizes in determining whether to waive
parole. OAL concluded that "Directive No. 82/15 thus adds
detailed procedures not found in either the Board's enabling
legislation or its regulations."
Directive No. 85/1 addresses the issue of the timing of a
parole consideration hearing when there is a change in the
prisoner's minimum eligible parole date. OAL found that this
directive clearly makes specific and implements existing statu-
tory and regulatory requirements.
According to OAL, "Directive No. 85/2 creates an addi-
tional procedural exception to the normal parole hearing
schedule." The directive explains the procedure to be em-
ployed in order to avoid holding both a documentation hear-
ing and a parole hearing within a relatively short time period.
OAL held that the directive interprets and implements exist-
ing statutes and regulations.
Directive No. 85/7 states: "The Board of Prison Terms
has approved a program which allows life term prisoners to
waive their formal parole consideration hearing, stipulate to
unsuitability or to request a postponement/continuance of their
hearing." According to OAL, this directive "appears to sig-
nificantly supplement existing rules or procedures governing
parole consideration hearings for life term prisoners." As such,
certain provisions of the directive are regulations that must
be adopted pursuant to the APA.
Directive 86/3 was issued in response to Haygood v.
Younger, 769 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1985), which authorizes
prisoners to make claims for damages for excessive cus-
tody. The directive creates a Due Process hearing entitled a
"Legal Status Review Hearing." The directive establishes:
"(1) criteria prisoners/parolees must meet in order to be en-
titled to a hearing; (2) procedures for filing a petition; (3)
requirements for contents of the petition; (4) when a peti-
tion can be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies; (5) procedures for notice to the prisoner, timing
and conduct of the hearing; and (6) the prisoner's appeal
rights." OAL concluded that the directive goes far beyond a
mere explanation of the law of the case itself by providing
the procedure for its implementation; as such, it is a regula-
tion.
The Board did not advocate, nor did OAL's research dis-
close, any applicable exemptions. OAL held that each of the
six challenged directives contains regulatory material that is
invalid unless adopted pursuant to APA rulemaking require-
ments.
* 2000 OAL Determination No. 9, Docket No. 99-0011
(May 18, 2000). Requester Kathleen Kenny challenged six
California Coastal Commission policies; the request arises
from Ms. Kenny's application for a coastal development per-
mit (CDP). In addressing the threshold issue, OAL pointed
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out that "Public Resources Code section 30333 makes the
APA expressly applicable to the Commission."
Ms. Kenny first questioned the Commission's require-
ment that she submit plans signed by a licensed landscape
architect. OAL acknowledged the Commission's authority to
impose special conditions on a case-by-case basis pursuant
to Public Resources Code section 30607. In addition, section
13156(c), Title 14 of the CCR, is a duly adopted regulation
that allows the Commission to mandate specific conditions
within a development permit. Thus, with respect to this is-
sue, OAL concluded that the Commission's requirement does
not constitute a "regulation" because it is not a rule of gen-
eral application; rather, the Commission's action was directed
specifically at Ms. Kenny's particular case.
Kenny next questioned the Commission's policies of: (1)
requiring that applicants for CDPs submit certificates of ap-
proval from local health and fire departments, and (2) delaying
the Commission's own approval until all other agency permits
have been issued. OAL found both of these policies to be di-
rect applications of valid, existing Commission regulations.
Ms. Kenny alleged that the Commission maintains a
policy of charging a $200 fee to add or change a name on a
CDP application. However, OAL found no evidence of the
existence of such a rule. Rather, the $200 fee to which Kenny's
request referred appeared to OAL to be the balance due on
the $500 application fee provided for in section 13055(a)(2),
Title 14 of the CCR.
According to OAL, "the Commission's policy requiring
submission of geology and soils reports for all Santa Monica
Mountains developments is a rule of general application." In
its response, the Commission asserted that "requirements con-
cerning geology and soils reports are not underground regula-
tions because they are authorized by both the Coastal Act and
Permit Streamlining Act, as well as the Commission's regula-
tions that implement both of these laws." OAL acknowledged
the Commission's authority to impose such requirements.
"However, whether the Commission has the authority for its
actions is not a factor in determining whether the Commission
has issued, utilized or enforced a rule, guideline or policy which
has not been adopted pursuant to the APA in order to imple-
ment, interpret or make specific the Coastal Act or existing
regulations." OAL held that the Commission's policy of re-
quiring geological reports is an underground regulation.
Finally, Ms. Kenny challenged a policy requiring appli-
cants, as a condition of Commission approval, to give per-
mission for Commission staff to inspect the development site
at any time during construction, subject only to 24-hour ad-
vance notice. The Commission responded that this "standard
condition at issue is not an underground regulation because
the Commission adopts it in individual permits as part of its
quasi-judicial action on coastal development permits." OAL
countered that "the Commission's response indicates that it
intends that the noticed inspection condition be applied gen-
erally to every applicant seeking a coastal development per-
mit. The Commission's action in imposing general conditions
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is not adjudicatory, but quasi-legislative," and thus is an un-
derground regulation.
After analyzing the APA exemption found in Public Re-
sources Code section 30333 for "interpretive guidelines" pro-
mulgated by the Commission, OAL concluded that none of
the policies challenged in this determination fall within that
exemption. (OAL mentioned in a footnote that the request
for determination had included a challenge to an interpretive
guideline. "OAL, however, did not accept this part of the re-
quest based on the existence of this APA exemption.") OAL
indicated that the "mandatory nature" of the policies disqualify
them for consideration as interpretive guidelines. At the same
time, OAL also reiterated its principle that "the critical factor
is not whether the 'regulation' is characterized as mandatory
or binding, but rather, its 'effect and impact on the public."'
* 2000 OAL Determination No. 10, Docket No. 99-012
(June 6, 2000). Requester Lawrence Fafarman challenged
the following statement appearing on the Web site of the Bu-
reau of Automotive Repair (BAR): "Do not add additional
emissions control equipment to your federally certified ve-
hicle in order to bring it to California. Do not attempt to make
a federal vehicle conform to California standards." OAL
pointed out that under Business and Professions Code sec-
tion 9882, BAR is subject to the rulemaking requirements of
the APA. OAL observed that while it is possible to read the
statement as having a meaning inconsistent with existing law,
the "website message, however, should not be read in isola-
tion." Taking into consideration other information available
on BAR's site, OAL held that the message in question, "while
perhaps not a model of clarity, does not appear to constitute a
departure from or addition to...existing legal authorities." As
such, the statement is a restatement of existing law and does
not constitute underground rulemaking.
* 2000 OAL Determination No. 11, Docket No. 99-013
(July 21,2000). Requester Scott Dunn challenged two Fran-
chise Tax Board (FTB) documents: (1) "Agreement on Coor-
dination of Tax Administration (Revision One)," a written
agreement between FTB and the federal Internal Revenue
Service establishing methods for their exchange of taxpayer
information; and (2) "Guidelines for Implementation of the
Agreement on Coordination of Tax Administration, Califor-
nia Franchise Tax Board-Internal Revenue Service, Revi-
sion One," which describes "the mechanics for the continu-
ous exchange of tax information...." OAL discovered that both
challenged documents had been superseded by second revi-
sions adopted before June 9, 1999, the date the request for
determination was accepted by OAL. Thus OAL held that
the issues as presented by the request were moot and that the
subsequently adopted documents had "not been properly
brought before OAL, and therefore, are not subject to OAL's
review at this time."
* 2000 OAL Determination No. 12, Docket No. 99-014
(July 21,2000). Public Employees for Environmental Respon-
sibility (PEER) asked OAL to determine whether testing pro-
cedures and standards utilized by the Department of Toxic
Substances Control (DTSC) in the certification of an aerosol
can recycling device known as the Katec Aerosolv® Model
6000 are underground regulations. Health and Safety Code
section 25106 makes the APA applicable to the Department.
PEER asserted that many of the objectives, criteria, stan-
dards, protocols, and procedures DTSC used to certify the de-
vice amount to regulatory precedents that DTSC would con-
tinue to employ in testing other disposal and recycling tech-
nologies. Nevertheless, OAL found "nothing in the record to
indicate that the Department has done anything other than es-
tablish a particular set of criteria...specifically for the purpose
of certifying the Katec aerosol spray technology. Admittedly,
establishing sampling techniques, numerical standards defin-
ing efficiency levels, and statistical confidence limits has a dis-
tinct 'regulatory' impact, particularly in the absence of pre-
existing standards... .But as the Department noted,...'although
protocols are developed using core scientific principles, each
protocol is specific to the device being tested."'
According to OAL, "[o]ne could argue as PEER essen-
tially has that in future cases, the Department might apply
the same standards it used with respect to the Katec Aerosolv
system. We cannot, however, base a finding concerning a stan-
dard of general application on unknown, future contingen-
cies." Consequently, OAL held that the challenged criteria
have specific rather than general application, and therefore
are not underground regulations.
* 2000 OAL Determination No. 13, Docket No. 99-015
(July 21, 2000). Requester Marc Schachter questioned three
rules contained in a memorandum entitled "Rules and Regu-
lations for the Facility D Gym at Corcoran State Prison" that
was promulgated under the auspices of the Department of
Corrections. The rules concern inmate eating, visiting, and
use of bunks in the named facility. OAL held: "There is no
evidence or assertion by Mr. Schachter that [the rules] were
issued or implemented at any other prison facility... .We agree
with the Department's position that [the rules] come within
the express 'local rules' exception and are therefore not sub-
ject to the APA."
* 2000 OAL Determination No. 14, Docket No. 99-016
(July 28,2000). CSEA challenged two policies of the State
Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF). The policies require
SCIF employees to record a reason for absence from work on
an attendance report form and define such "reason" to mean
"the exact nature of an illness." OAL held that SCIF is ex-
empt from the APA under Insurance Code section 11873. That
section provides in part that SCIF "shall not be subject to the
provisions of the Government Code made applicable to state
agencies generally or collectively...." OAL followed the rea-
soning of Courtesy Ambulance Service of San Bernardino v.
Superior Court, 8 Cal. App. 4th 1504 (1992), in concluding
that this statutory provision amounts to an express exemp-
tion from the APA.
* 2000 OAL Determination No. 15, Docket No. 99-017
(October 24,2000). Crusader Insurance Company challenged
Department of Insurance (DOI) rules requiring insurers to
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file all underwriting eligibility guidelines and to reduce all
such guidelines to writing. OAL made the threshold finding
that "the Department is an executive branch state agency that
has not been expressly exempted by statute. Thus, the APA
rulemaking requirements generally apply" to DOI. Regard-
ing the next test in the analysis, OAL noted that DOI "applies
these rules to all insurers where applicable; therefore, they
are rules of general application."
Concerning the requirement of filing all eligibility guide-
lines with DOI, OAL held that the rule is a "broad restate-
ment of existing law that encompasses many provisions of
the Department's regulations...and, therefore, does not con-
stitute a 'regulation"' subject to the APA. OAL concluded
that the requirement that guidelines be in writing is the only
legally tenable interpretation of various existing requirements:
"Unless documents are reduced to writing, it makes it virtu-
ally impossible to 'attach' documents to forms that are re-
quired to be filed, to 'maintain' documents in sufficient de-
tail 'to determine the appropriate rating plan for the insured,'
or to be subject to examination to ensure compliance with the
Insurance Code. As the Department points out in its response,
'Crusader does not offer a plausible alternative construction."'
Thus, OAL held that, as the only legally tenable interpreta-
tion of existing law, the second challenged rule not need be
adopted by DOI pursuant to APA rulemaking procedures.
* 2000 OAL Determination No. 16, Docket No. 99-018
(October 31, 2000). Rosalie Dvorak-Remis and the Sacra-
mento Little Pocket Neighborhood Association requested
OAL to consider a California Department of Transportation
(Caltrans) interpretation of the exclusive public use restric-
tion found in surplus right-of-way property deeds.
Caltrans is authorized to sell property that was previously
acquired for highway purposes but for which it no longer has
use. The California Transportation Commission establishes
the conditions and restrictions governing these sales. The deed
for such a conveyance in 1975 from Caltrans to the City of
Sacramento included a reversion clause requiring the prop-
erty to be used "exclusively for public purposes." When the
city contemplated leasing the property for a development
known as the "Captain's Table Project," the requesters had
several meetings with Caltrans representatives concerning the
meaning of the "exclusively for public purposes" deed provi-
sion. Those representatives indicated the restriction would
be satisfied as long as "the public is not barred from the pre-
mises." The issue for determination in this case was that in-
terpretation of the public purpose restriction.
OAL first found that "Caltrans is in neither the judicial
nor legislative branch of state government, nor has it been
expressly or specifically exempted by statute from comply-
ing with the APA. OAL concludes, therefore, that APA
rulemaking requirements generally apply to Caltrans."
Caltrans admitted that the requesters' characterization of
its interpretation of the public purpose deed provision is ac-
curate, but denied that the interpretation constitutes a regula-
tion on several grounds. First, Caltrans maintained that it does
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not have authority to issue such regulations; the Commission
has that particular authority. OAL responded that "the test
for the existence of a 'regulation' is not whether there is suf-
ficient authority or legal capacity, but rather the 'effect and
impact on the public' of the agency action....Thus any lack of
authority to adopt regulations would not nullify the existence
of a rule or policy that may contravene the APA."
Secondly, Caltrans asserted that the issue is moot because
restrictive use clauses of the type in this case are no longer
being included in deeds for the sale of excess lands. Because
the provision remains in existing deeds, however, OAL was
not persuaded by that argument.
Finally, Caltrans claimed that the interpretation enunci-
ated to the requesters is not a standard of general application,
but is rather an opinion limited to the specific property at
issue. According to OAL, "While the comments attributed to
the Caltrans employees do suggest the existence of a stan-
dard of general application, we think the unequivocal official
statement of the management of Caltrans that the interpreta-
tion in question is not one that is applied generally, and, in
this case, is limited to the deed in question, is sufficient to
persuade us that there is no interpretation of deed language
that is generally applied rising to a level of a 'regulation' that
must be adopted in accordance with APA procedures."
On December 1, 2000, OAL published notice that, ef-
fective November 27, 2000, it had granted a request by Ms.
Dvorak-Remis and the Little Pocket Neighborhood Associa-
tion for reconsideration and had withdrawn its original deter-
mination. At this writing, OAL has not yet published a re-
vised determination.
* 2000 OAL Determination No. 17, Docket No. 99-019
(November 6,2000). The California Coalition of Travel Or-
ganizations challenged criteria established by the California
Trade and Commerce Agency for potential providers of online
and toll-free telephone lodging reservation services.
The Trade and Commerce Agency, and specifically the
Division of Tourism within that Agency, promotes tourism in
California. One way the Agency seeks to do so is by develop-
ing a centralized lodging reservation system that provides
direct links with private reservation services through both the
Internet and a toll-free telephone number. According to OAL,
the Division of Tourism operates these reservation systems
"by utilizing private business organizations that provide the
lodging and reservation services. To do this, the Agency es-
tablished criteria to be used to select these private entities. In
the case of the toll-free telephone number, the Agency also
established contractual standards any selected entity must
meet. These criteria and standards are the subject of this regu-
latory determination."
The Agency argued that because the standards for the
telephone linkage system were adopted by means of a re-
quest for proposals process, they should not be considered
regulatory in nature. OAL countered that a "fundamental ob-
jective of the APA is to ensure that when a state agency imple-
ments a statute by specifying the process to be used in the
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selection of persons who will receive benefits from the gov-
ernment, the agency must first provide those same members
of the public with notice and an opportunity to participate in
the policy development process....The fact that a rule or cri-
teria may have been issued or utilized as part of a bidding
and proposal process does not insulate them from scrutiny
under the APA."
OAL found that the criteria and standards under consid-
eration "establish the rights, responsibilities, and obligations
of entities who wish to be directly linked....These criteria have
the effect of implementing and making specific the provi-
sions of the Tourism Marketing Act and related enabling leg-
islation of the Agency." Thus, OAL determined that the crite-
ria and standards amount to regulations that should be adopted
according to APA rulemaking procedures.
On January 5, 2001, OAL published notice that, effec-
tive December 17, 2000, it had granted a request by the De-
partment of General Services for reconsideration and had with-
drawn its original determination. At this writing, OAL has
not published a revised determination.
* 2001 OAL Determination No. 1, Docket No. 99-021
(February 7, 2001). Inmate Lenzie L. Jackson questioned
the method used by the Department of Corrections to recal-
culate post-sentence conduct and work credits pursuant to
People v. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th 497 (1996).
In 1995, following a conviction for the sale of marijuana,
Mr. Jackson was sentenced to 25 years to life under the "Three
Strikes" law (Penal Code sections 667 and 1170.12). Less
than a year later, the California Supreme Court's Romero de-
cision had the effect of authorizing trial judges to strike prior
felony conviction allegations in Three Strikes cases. Thus,
on August 15, 1997, the Sacramento County Superior Court
struck one of Jackson's two prior felony convictions and, ac-
cordingly, modified his sentence to only an eight-year term.
In that ruling, the court noted that Jackson's post-sentence
conduct and work credits were to be determined by the De-
partment. In making its determination of the amount of cred-
its to award Mr. Jackson, the Department followed the proce-
dure outlined in its "Instructional Memorandum CR/96/27."
As identified by OAL, the "key issue for this determina-
tion is whether the Department's policy is merely a restate-
ment of current law or whether it further implements or inter-
prets the law governing the manner in which an inmate's sen-
tencing time is computed." If the policy in question merely
restates existing law, or states the sole legally tenable inter-
pretation of existing law, then it is not an underground regu-
lation. In making the point that there was evidently more than
one interpretation of current law concerning calculation of
post-sentencing credit, OAL noted requester Jackson's alle-
gation that the Instructional Memorandum applied the law of
Romero incorrectly. Aside from any judgment as to legal cor-
rectness, Jackson's allegation demonstrates that there is in-
deed more than one possible interpretation. OAL held that
"the procedure established by the Department...in Romero
situations, whether consistent with the law or not, implements,
interprets, or makes specific the law with respect to the cal-
culation of credits....Thus, we conclude that the policy em-
ployed by the Department is a 'regulation' and is subject to
the APA...."
* 2001 OAL Determination No. 2, Docket No. 99-022
(March 19, 2001). The Union of American Physicians and
Dentists questioned whether the Department of Health Ser-
vices (DHS) could "amend" an existing regulation simply by
issuing a memorandum purportedly permitting clinical psy-
chologists to order physical restraint or seclusion for their
patients in health facilities.
In 1978, the legislature enacted Health and Safety Code
section 1316.5, which authorizes clinical psychologists to
"carry professional responsibilities consistent with the scope
of their licensure and their competence" in health facilities.
The section also provides that where a health facility offers a
service that both licensed physicians and clinical psycholo-
gists are permitted by law to perform, "the service may be
performed by either, without discrimination." In response to
this legislation, and contrary to its intent, DHS promulgated
regulations (sections 70577, 71545,72461,73409, and 79315,
Title 22 of the CCR) prohibiting licensed psychologists from
exercising primary responsibility in providing diagnosis and
treatment of patients in health facilities licensed by DHS. Spe-
cifically, one regulation identified physicians as the only per-
sons authorized to order physical restraint or seclusion for
such patients.
Subsequently, these regulations were challenged in Cali-
fornia Association of Psychology Providers v. Rank, 51 Cal.
3d 1 (1990). The California Supreme Court agreed with the
plaintiff psychologists that by enacting section 1316.5, the
legislature had manifested its intent to allow clinical psycholo-
gists to take primary responsibility for the treatment and care
of patients and to be able to function without the need for
supervision by physicians. As a result of this holding, the
California Psychological Association filed a petition with DHS
requesting that the regulations in question be amended to be
consistent with Rank and section 1316.5.
DHS agreed with the petition and, in 1994, issued a
memorandum stating "Regulatory amendments will be pro-
mulgated and filed at a later time....However, effective im-
mediately, the Department agrees to implement its intent to
permit psychologists...to order restraint and/or seclusion in
the same manner as a physician." DHS failed to follow through
with its pledge and never initiated formal rulemaking proce-
dures to properly amend the regulations.
In its determination opinion, OAL noted that the issue in
Rank was whether clinical psychologists should be allowed
to take primary responsibility for patients; the decision did
not directly address whether clinical psychologists may or-
der physical restraints or seclusion. Because the court had
not expressly decided this specific issue, DHS was precluded
from arguing that the challenged amendment-by-memo to the
physical restraint and seclusion regulation amounted to a
"change without regulatory effect." In other words, the Rank
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opinion had not already judicially amended the particular regu-
lation in question; the regulation remained valid and poten-
tially enforceable as originally adopted.
DHS next argued that its 1994 memorandum was tanta-
mount to a blanket grant of "program flexibility." Health and
Safety Code section 1276 authorizes DHS to grant "program
flexibility" to facilities to enable them to use alternate ap-
proaches, other than those specifically required by regula-
tion, as long as statutory requirements are still met. How-
ever, OAL noted that specific statutory procedures must be
followed by applicants and licensees when submitting requests
to DHS for program flexibility. OAL determined that pro-
gram flexibility was intended for use by individual health
facilities, after submission of a written request with support-
ing evidence, and on a case-by-case basis. OAL stated: "We
believe section 1276 was not intended to allow the Depart-
ment to issue general rules applicable to several facilities
across the board, thereby skirting the requirements of the
APA." Thus OAL found DHS' program flexibility argument
inapplicable.
OAL concluded that the amendments to the regulation
found in DHS' memorandum were indeed rules. To be effec-
tive, DHS must adopt them pursuant to APA rulemaking pro-
cedures.
*2001 OAL Determination No. 3, Docket No. 99-023
(March 28,2001). This is another request filed by PEER chal-
lenging a decision made by the Department of Toxic Sub-
stances Control (see 2000 OAL Determination No. 12, above).
Safety Kleen Systems, Inc. proposed to dispose of photo-
chemical waste by reducing it to a distiller sludge and dis-
tilled water with ammonia and less than .05 ppm silver; the
water mixture would then be used to irrigate non-food potted
plants. DTSC determined that this
subsequent use of the water would
qualify for an exemption as recy- aB 1822(Wans amer
clable material pursuant to Health various revisions to the
and Safety Code section Administrative Procedurn
25143.2(c)(2). PEER claimed that
in so doing, the Department had created an underground regu-
lation by promulgating an interpretation of the term "recy-
cling."
OAL explained that "[i]t is well-settled that the specific
interpretation and application of the law to one particular party
under peculiar facts and circumstances is not a rule or stan-
dard of general application....Thus, the Department's inter-
pretation of 'recycling,' as it applied solely to Safety Kleen
and to the circumstances...is not a rule or standard of general
application, and therefore, is not a 'regulation' subject to the
APA." OAL also pointed out that the question of whether
DTSC is actually correct in its decision regarding the waste
water is "not an appropriate issue to be addressed by OAL in
a determination."
* 2001 OAL Determination No. 4, Docket No. 99-024
(April 11, 2001). Inmate Jamall Baker challenged a Depart-
ment of Corrections policy of treating juvenile adjudications
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and charged but un-convicted offenses as "convictions" for
purposes of determining inmates' classifications. The Depart-
ment uses this classification system to assign prisoners to "the
institution of the appropriate security level" (Penal Code sec-
tion 5068). Under a duly adopted Department regulation, sec-
tion 3375.2(b)(25), Title 15 of the CCR, inmates with current
or prior convictions are required to be placed in facilities with
higher levels of security.
OAL found sufficient evidence to conclude that the policy
in question is applied broadly, and not just specifically to Mr.
Baker's particular case. Therefore, OAL held that the policy
constitutes an underground regulation to which no APA ex-
emption applies.
* 2001 OAL Determination No. 5, Docket No. 99-025
(April 11, 2001). Inmate Richard A. Mongeon challenged a
Department of Corrections policy-known as "mandatory
yard call" -that requires inmates to remain outside their hous-
ing units each weekday between 8:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. in
order to facilitate routine cleaning. Under Penal Code sec-
tion 5058(c)(1), Department rules that apply solely to one
particular correctional facility are not considered regulations.
Because OAL found no evidence to suggest that the chal-
lenged policy applies anywhere other than the Susanville
Correctional Center, OAL held that the local prison exemp-
tion is applicable; thus the challenged rule is not a regulation
subject to the rulemaking procedures of the APA.
2000 LEGISLATION
AB 1822 (Wayne), as amended August 23,2000, makes
various revisions to the rulemaking provisions of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act. The bill: (1) provides for the use of
electronic communication in the delivery and publication of
notices and rulemaking docu-
led August 23, 2000, makes ments, but specifies that such
lemaking provisions of the electronic communication is notto be the exclusive means by
which the documents are pub-
lished or distributed; (2) autho-
rizes state agencies to consult with interested persons before
initiating regulatory action; (3) revises the provisions gov-
erning preliminary determinations made by state agencies with
respect to certain notices of proposed actions; (4) requires
certain additional reports on findings regarding businesses
that are to be included in rulemaking notices; (5) requires the
use of plain English in all regulations, and revises the defini-
tion of the term "plain English"; (6) requires state agencies to
permit oral testimony at public hearings on proposed regula-
tions, subject to reasonable limitations; (7) changes the man-
ner in which a state agency may respond to repetitive or irrel-
evant comments in its statement of reasons for a regulatory
action; (8) modifies the provisions governing the availability
and content of the rulemaking file; (9) revises certain
rulemaking provisions to apply to a proposed repeal of a regu-
lation as well as a proposed adoption or amendment of a regu-
lation; (10) creates an exception to the APA's rulemaking re-




quirements for a regulation that establishes criteria or guide-
lines to be used by the staff of a state agency in performing
an audit, investigation, examination, or inspection, in settling
a commercial dispute or negotiating a commercial arrange-
ment, or in the defense, prosecution, or settlement of a case,
subject to specified conditions; (11) creates an express ex-
ception to the rulemaking requirements for a state agency rule
that is the only legally tenable interpretation of an existing
law; (12) revises the APA's standards for demonstrating the
necessity of a proposed regulation by a state agency; (13)
clarifies that the period for review of a proposal to make an
emergency regulation permanent is 30 working days, rather
than 30 days; (14) provides for judicial review of an order of
repeal of a regulation as well as a regulation, and expands the
types of evidence that a court may consider as part of the
review proceeding; (15) changes the name of the California
Regulatory Code Supplement to the California Code of Regu-
lations Supplement; (16) revises the format required for State
Water Resources Control Board policies, plans, and guide-
lines submitted to OAL; (17) requires a state agency under
specified circumstances to deliver to OAL for publication in
the California Regulatory Notice Register notice of its deci-
sion not to proceed with a proposed action; and (18) makes
various other technical and clarifying changes to the APA.
AB 1822 was signed by Governor Davis on September 30,
2000 (Chapter 1060, Statutes of 2000).
AB 505 (Wright), as amended August 28, 2000, enacts
the Small Business Regulatory Reform Act of 2000. The bill
revises various provisions of the APA with respect to the du-
ties of OAL and state agencies in the adoption, amendment,
and repeal of regulations. Incor-
porating many provisions in-
cluded within AB 1822 (Wayne) AB 505 (Writs aen
(see above), AB 505: (1) autho- tSll uses s Regukrize stae aencis ad QA ~o bill revises various provisrizes state agencies and O AL to to hed i sofO La d l
extend the time period for public to the duties of OAL and st
comment in specified circum- amendment, and repealo'
stances; (2) modifies the informa-
tion that a state agency is required to submit along with the
notice of the proposed regulatory action to include (a) the
text of the proposal drafted in "plain, straightforward lan-
guage, avoiding technical terms as much as possible, and us-
ing a coherent and easily readable style," (b) a notation list-
ing both the specific authorizing statutes and the provisions
of law being implemented, interpreted, or made specific, (c)
a statement of the specific purpose of each action and why it
is necessary, (d) identification of any studies or reports sup-
porting the regulatory action, (e) a description of reasonable
alternatives to the regulation and the agency's reasons for
rejecting those alternatives, and (f) facts, documents, testi-
mony, or other evidence on which the agency relies to sup-
port an initial determination that the action will not have a
significant adverse economic impact on business; (3) recasts
the provisions concerning the various pieces of information
required to be included in the notice of proposed regulatory
action in order to make the nature and effect of the action
more understandable for both small businesses and the gen-
eral public; (4) revises the method a state agency must utilize
to make a determination as to whether a regulatory proposal
has the potential for significant, statewide adverse economic
impact directly affecting California business enterprises; (5)
modifies the procedure for notifying interested persons of the
proposed adoption, amendment, or repeal of a regulation; (6)
imposes additional requirements on state agencies issuing
regulations in order to make the regulatory process more user-
friendly and improve communications between the parties in
the regulatory process; and (7) requires each state agency to
designate at least one person to serve as a small business liai-
son. Additionally, this bill requires OAL to post the Califor-
nia Regulatory Notice Register on its Web site by January 1,
2002, and moves the Office of Small Business Advocate from
the state Trade and Commerce Agency to the Governor's
Office of Planning and Research. Governor Davis signed AB
505 on September 30, 2000 (Chapter 1059, Statutes of 2000).
AB 2877 (Thomson), as amended June 15, 2000, is an
omnibus budget trailer bill concerning public health programs.
Section 70 of the bill adds section 14105.17 to the Welfare
and Institutions Code, which declares that hospitals desig-
nated by DHS as critical access hospitals shall be eligible for
supplemental payments for Medi-Cal covered outpatient ser-
vices rendered to Medi-Cal eligible persons. Because pay-
ments made under this provision are contingent upon federal
funding, the section directs DHS to promptly seek any neces-
sary federal approvals. Subsection (e) states that DHS' initial
emergency regulations and the first readoption of those regu-
lations to implement this new sec-
tion will be "deemed to be an
d Reformut 2000. en s emergency and necessary for thery Reform Act of 2000.The immediate preservation of the
ns of the APA with respect public peace, health and safety, or
agencies in the adoption, general welfare," and are thus ex-
egulations, empt from OAL review.
Section 106 of the bill, which
was not tied to any specific code section, utilizes similar lan-
guage to authorize DHS to "adopt emergency regulations to
implement the applicable provisions of this act..... Which pro-
visions are "applicable" was not specified; the act made revi-
sions in the Education, Government, Health and Safety, Insur-
ance, and Welfare and Institutions Codes. Just as in section
14105.17, emergency regulations adopted pursuant to this pro-
vision, along with their first readoption, are deemed to be an
emergency and necessary and are exempt from OAL review.
The Governor signed AB 2877 on July 6, 2000 (Chapter
93, Statutes of 2000) and it went into effect as urgency legis-
lation on the following day.
AB 1098 (Romero), as amended August 25, 2000, di-
rects DHS to establish standards for the registration of Medi-
Cal "billing agents." These standards are to be adopted as
emergency regulations. The bill provides that both their adop-
tion and readoption are deemed to be necessary and are ex-






empt from OAL review. Similarly, the bill authorizes DHS to
"adopt, readopt, repeal, or amend" regulations on an emer-
gency basis "to prevent or curtail fraud and abuse" in the
Medi-Cal system. Such regulations are also automatically
deemed necessary and are exempt from OAL review. Gover-
nor Davis signed this bill on September 5,2000 (Chapter 322,
Statutes of 2000).
AB 1295 (Firebaugh), as introduced, would have modi-
ied the way in which the Department of Personnel Adminis-
tration (DPA) is partially exempted from the rulemaking re-
quirements of the APA. [17:1 CRLR 222] However, the bill
was amended on June 19, 2000 so that it no longer pertains to
)PA or the APA.
2001 LEGISLATION
SB 561 (Morrow), as amended April 30, 2001, would
repeal Government Code section 11340.8 and revise and con-
solidate its provisions into section 11340.85. Existing sec-
tion 11340.85 provides that public comments and petitions
regarding agency regulations may be submitted by electronic
means "if the agency has expressly indicated a willingness to
receive" them that way. This bill would delete that condition
for comments, instead requiring agencies to accept public
comments submitted by electronic communication. The pro-
vision for petitions would remain conditioned upon the
agency's express willingness. [S. Jud]
SB 563 (Morrow), as introduced February 22, 2001,
would revise and recast the statutory provisions pursuant to
which the Director of the Department of Corrections may
adopt regulations concerning temporary pilot programs and
situations involving imminent danger without complying with
the requirements of the APA. [A. Appr]
SB 402 (Ortiz), as amended March 29,2001, would ex-
empt from OAL review the initial adoption of emergency regu-
lations by DHS pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 14005.7(d)(2)(a). That provision states that, on and
after January 1, 2002, any 19- or 20-year-old who qualifies
as a medically needy family person should have an additional
monthly income deduction equal to the difference between
the amount required for maintenance and an amount equal to
100% of the applicable federal poverty level. The bill would
also exempt from OAL review emergency regulations as ini-
tially adopted by the Managed Risk Medical Insurance Board
that have the purpose of securing federal approval to extend
the coverage of the Healthy Families program to those ages
19 and 20. [S. Appr]
AB 422 (Diaz), as amended April 4, 2001, would ex-
empt from OAL review emergency regulations adopted by
DHS to implement the Childhood Lead Poisoning Safety Act
of 200 1. [A. Health]
AB 321 (Vargas), as amended April 16, 2001, would
require the Secretary of the Business, Transportation and
Housing Agency to create and implement a program to award
grants to public agencies to develop public use facilities as-
sociated with transit stations as part of proposed projects that
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will increase rail or bus transit ridership in a cost-effective
manner. The bill would direct the Secretary to adopt imple-
menting regulations. Under the bill's provisions, those regu-
lations would not be subject to OAL review.
This bill would also establish the Congestion Relief
Transportation Trust Fund, 10% of which would be placed in
the Transit Capital Account for allocation by the California
Transportation Commission to projects that extend light and
commuter rail lines, build fueling stations, purchase rolling
stock and buses, construct other transit facilities, and to pur-
chase rights of way. The bill would require the Commission
to allocate Account funds based on cost-effectiveness crite-
ria that prioritize projects that reduce vehicle miles traveled
or growth in vehicle miles traveled. Such criteria are to be
adopted by the Commission through regulations; under the
bill's provisions, these regulations would not be subject to
OAL review. [A. Trans]
AB 1666 (Keeley). Existing law requires the Department
of Social Services (DSS) to license community care facilities
participating in transitional housing placement programs to
provide supervised apartment living services for certain 17-
and 18-year-old persons who are in out-of-home placements
under the supervision of the county department of social ser-
vices or the county probation department and who are par-
ticipating in an independent living program. Existing law also
requires DSS to adopt regulations to govern transitional hous-
ing placement facilities, including regulations establishing a
ratesetting system. As introduced on February 23, 2001, this
bill would permit DSS to adopt emergency regulations to
implement such a ratesetting system. The initial emergency
regulations and the first readoption of those regulations would
be exempt from review by OAL. [A. HumanS]
AB 950 (Wright), as amended April 23, 2001, would
direct the Department of Developmental Services to mandate
a training program for direct care staff employed in licensed,
regional center funded community care facilities for persons
with developmental disabilities. The bill would require the
Department to adopt emergency regulations to implement the
training program. Such regulations, along with the first re-
adoption thereof, would be statutorily deemed necessary and
would be exempt from OAL review. [S. Rls]
AB 767 (Goldberg), as amended April 25, 2001, would
provide that persons convicted of specified felonies related
to controlled substances are ineligible for aid under
CaIWORKs, non-health-care general assistance benefits, or
food stamps unless they meet specified conditions related to
drug treatment. The bill would require DSS to adopt imple-
menting regulations by no later than January 1, 2003. The
bill would permit DSS to implement drug screening provi-
sions for convicted drug felons "through all county letters or
similar instructions from the director." Further, the bill would
provide that the initial emergency regulations adopted pursant
to the act are exempt from OAL review. [A. Floor]
SB 526 (Sher). The existing Barry Keene Underground
Storage Tank Cleanup Trust Fund Act of 1989 requires the State
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Water Resources Control Board to adopt implementing regu-
lations; the Board is authorized to adopt regulations on an emer-
gency basis concerning the requirements for demonstrating fi-
nancial responsibility and establishing corrective action require-
ments. As amended March 26, 2001, this bill would withdraw
the Board's specific authority to adopt such emergency regula-
tions to implement those provisions. [S. Appr]
AB 969 (Chan), as introduced February 23,2001, would
establish an additional deduction from income to reduce the
share of cost requirements in the Medi-Cal medically needy
program for individuals and families. The bill would provide
for work incentive deductions and deductions for conserva-
torship and other fees for medically needy individuals in long-
term care. AB 969 would also amend the Medi-Cal program
for aged and disabled individuals who have income up to
100% of the federal poverty level by increasing the couple
income deduction from $310 to $425, and increasing both
the individual and couple deductions annually, beginning
January 1, 2004, for cost of living adjustments. DHS would
be required to adopt emergency implementing regulations
which, along with their first readoption, would be exempt
from OAL review. [A. Health]
Bureau of State Audits
State Auditor: Elaine M. Howle * (916) 445-0255 * Whistleblower's Hotline: (800) 952-5665.
Internet: www.bsa.ca.gov
reated by SB 37 (Maddy) (Chapter 12, Statutes of
1993), the Bureau of State Audits (BSA) is an audit-
ing and investigative agency which opera es under
the administrative oversight of the Milton Marks Commis-
sion on California State Government Organization and
Economy (also known as the "Little Hoover Commission").
In Government Code section 8543 et seq., SB 37 delegates to
BSA most of the duties previously performed by the Auditor
General's Office, such as examining and reporting annually
upon the financial statements prepared by the executive branch
of the state, performing other related assignments (such as
performance audits) that are mandated by statute, and admin-
istering the California Whistleblower Protection Act, Gov-
ernment Code section 8547 et seq. BSA is also required to
conduct audits of state and local government requested by
the Joint Legislative Audit Committee (JLAC) to the extent
that funding is available. BSA is headed by the State Auditor,
appointed by the Governor to a four-year term from a list of
three qualified individuals submitted by the JLAC.
On August 3, 2000, Governor Davis announced his ap-
pointment of Elaine M. Howle as State Auditor. Howle, for-
merly the deputy state auditor, has been with BSA since 1993.
She previously worked for the Employment Development
Department from 1992-93 and for the Office of the Auditor
General from 1983-92. She is a certified public accountant
and a certified government financial manager.
MAJOR PROJECTS
Performance Audit of State Bar
In 1997, then-Governor Wilson vetoed a bill providing
the California State Bar-the state's attorney regulatory
agency -with its primary source of revenue; the veto led to
the Bar's layoff of almost 500 employees during 1998 and a
near-shutdown of the entire agency, in-
cluding its attorney discipline system. In 1999, Governor
Davis signed SB 144 (Schiff and Hertzberg) (Chapter 342,
Statutes of 1999), which once again authorized the Bar to
collect licensing fees from its members but restricted the Bar's
use of those fees and required BSA to conduct a performance
audit of the Bar's operations between July and December 2000
(see agency report on STATE BAR for related discussion).
In compliance with SB 144, BSA reviewed several as-
pects of the Bar's operations and released State Bar of Cali-
fornia: It Has Improved Its Disciplinary Process, Steward-
ship of Members' Fees, and Administrative Practices, but
Its Cost Recovery and Controls Over Expenses Need
Strengthening in April 2001. BSA's findings in these areas
are as follows.
- State Bar Disciplinary Process. When the Bar was
forced to lay off its discipline staff in 1998, it had about 4,400
open complaints in its enforcement inventory; during the shut-
down, it accumulated an additional 3,000 complaints against
attorneys-resulting in an enormous backlog of
uninvestigated complaints. To reduce the backlog, the Bar
implemented a plan to prioritize cases so that the most seri-
ous complaints receive attention first; cases alleging minor
violations are now mediated in the Bar's intake unit, dis-
missed, or referred to other remedies. BSA found that this
prioritization system enables the Bar's investigators to focus
most of their attention on serious cases that will likely result
in discipline, and lessens the number of cases flowing for-
ward for prosecution, hearing, and review by the State Bar
Court. According to BSA, "the data indicate that the priority
system is enabling the State Bar to use its resources better
than in 1995."
BSA also reported that the Bar has revised the cost model
on which its "cost recovery" system is based to increase the
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